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5. Sale of the good-will of a going concern.
Where a partner sells out all of his share in, or his share of the
stock in a going concern, the presumption is that he meant to in-
clude the good-will, though the latter be not specifically mentioned.
In 07hurton v. Douglas, Johns. Ch. R. 174, V. 0. WOOD says: "I
apprehend, that; when a man, who has been a partner in a firm,
assigns his share and is paid for his share as it stands in the part-
nership books, he sells his share as in a going concern, and is in
a very different position from that which he would have occupied
upon a mere dissolution of the partnership, in the ordinary way,
where the affairs of the whole concern would have to be wound up,
and he would only get what it would produce. * * He gets there-
fore the benefit of his share in the business as a going concern."
6. When a firm is dissolved during the lifetime of all the part-
ners, the right to use the firm name is common to all alike.-This
was decided in the case of Banks v. Gzibson, 34 Beav. 566, by
Sir J. ROMILLY, M. R., who says : "If the partners chose to divide
the partnership assets each is at liberty to use the trade-mark,
just as much as before. If two persons carried on business as
Child & Co., and they thought fit to separate, each might call him-
self Child & Co., and there is nothing to prevent him from so
doing. It is the name by which they are known and the business
carried on. If the "plaintiffs had stipulated that the defendant
was not after the dissolution to use the name or style, she ought to
have paid a fair proportion of the value of the trade-mark, but
VOL. XXI=.-82 (649)
GOOD-WILL.
it was not so, they divided the common assets and left this asset to
be enjoyed in common; in my opinion they are both entitled to
use the style or firm of Banks & Co., and consequently that the
whole case made by this bill fails." In Williams v. Wilson, 4
Sand. Oh. 379, exactly the opposite view was taken, and it was
said that an injunction would be granted against all of the mem-
bers of a dissolved partnership to prevent them from conducting
the same business in New York, unless the good-will of the estab-
lishment (a private insane asylum) were bought by one of them.
It would seem, however, to be just to permit either partner to
treat the good-will as a partnership asset and to compel a sale of
the good-will (including the name) in the absence of stipulations
agreeing to divide it. It would seem unjust, where one partner
would derive immense benefit from the use of the good-will and
the others none whatever, to permit the former to enjoy this with-
out compensation, though its value had been the result of the
labor and credit of others in conjunction with himself.
7. Where a portion of the value of the good-will of the business
done by a corporation arises from its name, made up from. the names
of several of the original stockholders, so used without their objec-
tion, the corporation acquires a right of property-in its name, and
the owners of those names must use them until the dissolution of
the coporation, subject to the rights of the other corporators.
In the recent ease of Holmes, Booth f Raydens v. olmes,
Booth J- Atwood Manufacturing Co., 37 Conn. 278, the plaintiffs
were a corporation organized and who had acquired a considerable
reputation under the name of Holmes, Booth & Haydens. Holmes,
Booth & H. H. & J. A.. Hayden were among the original stock-
holders, the two former continuing so at the time that this suit was
brought, but having disposed of all but a very inconsiderable
number of their shares. In 1868-9, Holmes, Booth and Atwood,
who had been one of the directors of the plaintiffs, formed with
certain other persons a new corporation under the name of The
Holmes, Booth & Atwood MIanufacturing Co., and engaged in the
same town with plaintiffs in the same business. Much confusion
in their correspondence arose on account of the similarity of the
names of the corporations, and it was averred by plaintiffs that
by reason thereof dealers were likely to be misled into the belief
that the companies were the same.
The Supreme Court of Errors advised the Superior Court to
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grant an injunction against the use by the respondents of the name
under which they were trading. SEYMOUR, J., said that there
was no difference, as regarded the use of the name, between a cor-
poration and partnership ; that the intention on the part of the
respondents to commit fraud was not necessary in order for the
relief sought, which depended on the injury to the party aggrieved;
that it was of no importance that Holmes & Booth might give up
all connection with the plaintiffs; and finally that until the disso-
lution of the corporation plaintiff, Holmes & Booth'must use their
own names subject to the rights of the petitioners.
8. The ground of relief in equity against the use by another of a
firm-name or trade-mark is property. But relief will not be
granted if the plaintiff has been guilty of misrepresentation, in
his marks or otherwise, calculated to deceive the public.
In The Leather Cloth Company Limited v. The American
Leather Cloth Company Limited, 4 De G., J. & S., Lord WEST-
BURY, Chancellor, reversed the decree of the Vice-Chancellor
(WOOD) and dismissed the bill of plaintiffs praying for an injunc-
tion restraining the defendants from using the name of L. 1.
C. P. Crockett, or the name of Crockett Co., stamped or affixed
to any fabric mnufactured by them, or so introduced thereon as
to represent the fabric manufactured by the defendants as that
manufactured by the plaintiffs, &c. The case below is reported in
1 Hemming & Miller 271.
The Chancellor said: "At law the remedy for the piracy of a
trade-mark is by an action on the case in the nature of a writ of
deceit. This remedy is founded on fraud, and originally it seems
that an action was given not only to the trader whose mark has been
pirated, but also to the buyer in the market, if he had been in-
duced by the fraud to buy goods of an inferior quality. In equity,
the right to give relief to the trader whose trade has been injured.
by the piracy appears to have been originally assumed by reason
of the inadequacy of the remedy at law, awid the necessity of pro:.
tecting property of this description by injunction. But although
the jurisdiction is now well settled, there is still current (in several
recent cases) language which seems to me to give an inaccurate
statement of the true ground on which it rests. In Croft v. Day,
7 Bear. 88, and Perry v. Truefitt, 6 Beav. 73, Lord LANGDALE
is reported to have used words which place the jurisdiction of this
court to grant relief in cases of piracy of trade-marks entirely on
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the ground of the fraud that is committed when one man sells his
own goods as the goods of another. The words of the learned
judge are, "I own it does not seem to me that a man can acquire
property merely in a name or mark," and in like manner the
learned V. C. (WOOD) whose decision I am now reviewing, is re-
ported to have said: "All these cases of trade-mark turn not upon
*a question of property but upon this, whether the act of the de-
fendant is such as to hold out his goods as the goods of the plain-
tiff." (1 II. & M. 287.) But with great respect this is hardly an
accurate statement; for, first, the goods of one man may be sold
as the goods of another, without giving to that other person a
right to complain, unless he sustains or is likely to sustain from
the wrongful act some pecuniary loss or damage; Olark v. Free-
man, 11 Beav. 112 ; and, secondly, it is not requisite for the ex-
ercise of the jurisdiction that there should be fraud or imposition
practised at all. The court will grant relief though the defendant
had no intention of selling his own gQods as the goods of the
plaintiff, or of practising any fraud either on the plaintiff or the
public." Millington v. Fox, 3 Al. & Cr. 338, and Welch v. Knott,
4 K. & J. 747, approved.
"Imposition on the public, occasioned by one man selling his
goods as the goods of another, cannot be the ground of private
action or suit. In the language of Lord TluRLow in Webster v.
Webster, 3 Swanst. 490 n. : ' The fraud upon the public is no
ground for the plaintiff coming-into this court.' [But] imposition
on the public becomes the test of the property in the trade-mark
having been invaded and injured, and not the ground on which
the court rests its jurisdiction.
"The representation which the defendant is supposed to make
that his goods are the goods of another person is not actually made
otherwise than by his appropriating and using the trade-mark,
which such other person has an exclusive right to use in connec-
tion with the sale of some commodity.
"It is correct to say that there is no exclusive ownership of the
symbols which constitute a trade-mark apart from the use or appli-
cation of them. * * * The true principle therefore would seem
to be that the jurisdiction of the court, in the protection given to
trade-marks, rests upon property, and that the court interferes by
injunction, because that is the only mode by which property of this
description can be effectually protected.
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" The same things are necessary to constitute a title to relief in
equity, in the case of the infringement of the right to a trade-mark,
as in the case of the violation of any other right of property."
This case was affirmed on appeal in the House of Lords (11 II.
of L. Cas. 523), Lord CRANWORTI1 saying: "The right which a
manufacturer has in his trade-mark is the exclusive right to use it
for the.purpose of indicating where, or by whom, or at what manu-
factory, the article to which it is affixed was manufactured. If
the word 'property' is aptly applied with reference to copyright, I
see no reason for doubting that it may with equal propriety be
applied to trade-marks. But I further think that the right to a
trade-mark may, in general, treating it as property or as an ac-
cessory of property, be sold and transferred upon a sale and trans-
fer of the manufactory of the goods on which the mark has been
used to be affixed, and may be lawfully used by the purchaser."
[Lord CRANWORTH then put the case of a trade-mark, consisting
of the name of the manufacturer, and asked how far it might be
used as a trade-mark after his death, or after the sale of the manu-
factory to a purchaser.] "The question in every such case must be,
whether the purchaser in continuing the use of the original trade-
mark would, according to the ordinary usages of trade, be under-
stood as saying more than that he was carrying on the same busi-
ness as bad been formerly carried on by the person whose
name constituted the trade-mark. In such a case I see nothing to
make it improper for the purchaser to use the old trade-marks, as
the mark would, in such a case, indicate only that the goods so
marked were made at the manufactory that he had purchased."
His Lordship, however, decided that in the particular case there
had been no substantial imitation of plaintiff's trade-mark. Lord
KINGSDOWN affirmed the decision on that ground, and on the ad-
ditional one that plaintiffs had been guilty of misrepresentations
in pretending by their trade-mark or advertisement that their
cloth was manufactured by Crocketts, was patented and was tanned.
The alleged misrepresentations lay in the use of the mark of the
words Crocketts J& Co. Tanned Leather Cloth, Patented, and J.
B. & 0: C. Orockett, lanufacturers, all of which, if considered as
averments of the state of affairs existing when the suit was begun,
were untrue. Lord WESTBURY, who had decided the case below on
the ground last mentioned, gave the additional reason that there
was no substantial imitation in the two advertisements or marks.
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" Suppose," says Lord WESTBURY (in The Leather Cloth Co.
Limited v. The American Leather Cloth Co. Limited, 4 DeG. J.
& S., at p. 14:3), "a partnership to have been formed a century
ago, unler a style or firm composed of the names of the then
partners, and that the partnership has been continued by the
admission of new partners in an unbroken series of successive part-
nerships, trading under the same original style, although the names
,f the present partners are wholly different from those in the
original firm; is it an imposition on the public that such partners
should continue to use the style or firm of the original partner-
ship ? This question must be answered, without any doubt, in the
negative.
"But suppose an individual or a firm to have gained credit for a
particular manufacture, and that the goods are marked or stamped
in such a way as to denote that they are made by such person or
firm, and that the name has gained currency and credit in the
market (there being no secret process or invention): could such
person or firm, on ceasing to carry on business, sell and assign the
right to use such name and mark to another firm, carrying on the
same business in a different place? Suppose a firm of A. B. ,.
Co. to have been clothiers in Wiltshire fior fifty years, and that
broadcloth marked A. B. &. Co., 1akers, Wilts, has obtained a
great reputation in the market, and that A. B. ,. Co., on discon-
tinuing business, sell and transfer the right to use their name an.d
mark to a firm of (. D. & (o., who are clothiers in Yorkshire;
would the latter be protected by a court of equity in their claim
to an exclusive right to use the name and mark of A. B. ,j. Co. P
I am of opinion that no such protection ought to be given.
Where any symbol or label claimed as a trade-mark is so con-
structed or worded as to make or contain a distinct assertion,
which is false, I think no property can be claimed for it, or, in
other words, the right to the exclusive use of it cannot be main-
tained.
"Property in a trade mark is, as has been already observed, the
right to the exclusive use of some mark, name or symbol in con-
nection with a particular manufacture or vendible commodity,
consequently the use of the same word in connection with a differ-
ent article is not an infringement of such right of property."
In TWotherspoon v. Currie, 27 L. T. N. S. 393, the House of
Lords made a decree restraining defendant perpetually from using
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the word " Glenfield," upon any labels affixed to packages of
starch manufactured by him, from representing the starch manu-
factured by him to be " Glenfield starch," and from selling it as
such. The' Lord Chancellor (IHATHERLEY) rested his decision on
the ground of deception of the public and consequent injury to
the plaintiff; Lord CHELMSFORD said: "Where the trade-mark
is not actually copied, fraud is a necessary element in the consid-
erati6n of every question of this description; that is, the party
accused of piracy must be proved to have done the act complained
of with the fraudulent design of passing off his own goods as those
of the party entitled to the exclusive use of the trade-mark."
Lord WESTBURY planted his decision upon the ground of property,
for the reasons so admirably expressed in his opinions already
cited. The word "Glenfield," (the name of a small hamlet in
Scotland), had, he said, acquired, in connection with a particular
manufacture of starch, a secondary signification, viz. : the starch
manufactured by plaintiffs. As a denomination of starch it had
become the property of plaintiffs. It was their right and title,
and this property had been invaded by the defendants.
Bury v. Bedford, 4 DeG. J. & S. 852. This was a bill
brought by the purchaser of the joint estate of the partners in the
firm of Bedford, Burys & Co., asking that the defendant, who had
been one of the partners in that firm, should be restrained from
using, or granting to any one the right to use, a corporate trade-
mark (which consisted of the figure of a lion couchant, surmounted
by crossed arrows, with four initial letters, viz. J. 0. B. S., within
the spaces formed by the arrows), or the mark Ulrn. Ash a- Co.,
&c., or to prevent the plaintiff from having the exclusive use of
the said trade-marks.
Lord Justice TURNER said that there was nothing in the char-
acter of the mark (above described) to prevent its assigna-
bility. He thought that the objection to a mark that it was so
completely personal as of necessity to import that the goods sold
under it had been manufactured by a particular individual, was
one which applied rather to the use of the mark when assigned
than to ihe power of assigning it. It was evident that a mark
originally personal might become appropriated to goods manufac-
tured at particular places. He held, that, under the creditors'
deed by which the separate estate of the partners as well as the
firm assets had been conveyed to trustees, the trade-mark passed.
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IHe abstained from giving any opinion whether the trade-mark
would have passed to the assignee. As to the use of the mark
W. Ash 5- Go., he held that on the formation of a partnership,
where one partner has the right to use a trade-mark, the latter
passes into the partnership assets. Injunction granted.
In Bradbury v. Bardin, 35 Conn. 577, an action on the case
for fraudulent misrepresentation was brought by the plaintiff, who
had bought from the defendant, a physician, his practice, upon the
representations of the latter that he was a regular practitioner and
his business such as a regular physician could engage in. Held,
that evidence to show that defendant's practice was irregular and
eclectic, and to prove specific acts of irregular practice as an abor-
tionist, was admissible; and a verdict having been given for plain-
tiff a new trial was refused.
In Spier v. Lambdin, 45 Ga. 319, an injunction was granted
restraining defendant, who had induced plaintiff to purchase of
him the lease of an academy, under the understanding that if
plaintiff would buy, defendant would give up teaching in the neigh-
borhood during the lease.
In Stone v. Carlan, 3 'Mo. Law R. 360, Howard v. Henriques,
3 Sandf. 725, and Marsh v. Billings, 7 Cush. 822, injunctions
were granted at the suits of persons holding contracts with hotel
proprietors, and in Deig v. Lamb, 6 Robertson (N. Y.) 535, at the
instance of the hotel proprietor, restraining defendants, who were
coach-proprietors, from using the names of the hotels Revere House,
Irving House and Prescott House, &c., upon their coaches and on
the caps of the drivers, &c., after a license to do so bad expired.
In Uhrist1 v. ll'trphy, the use of the name Christy's Minstrels,
as a designation of a company of negro minstrels, was restrained
at the instance of Christy, the organizer of the band. In Wood-
ward v. Lazar, 21 Cal. 448, the plaintiff had occupied a leased
building as a hotel, under the name The What Cheer House; sub-
sequently he gave up that building, moving into an adjoining one,
where he continued the business under the same name. Defend-
ants then opened a hotel in the first building, under the name The
Original What Cheer House. They were restrained by injunc-
tion.
In Sheldon v. Houghton, 5 Blatch. C. C. 285, it was said by
SHIPMAN, J., that "good-will must always rest upon some principal
and tangible thing, and * * * it can never arise as an asset of a
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partnership, where the members only contribute as capital their
professional skill and reputation, however intrinsically valuable
these may be."
In this-case it was held that the right resting upon the custom
of the trade, where a firm has published a book, not the subject of
statute copyright, to exclude others from engaging in the publica-
tion of the same book, is not good-will, and that such a right can-
not be protected in equity.
In Comstock v. White, 10 Abb. Pr. R. 264, note, it was held
that in the absence of a patent all persons had an equal right to
manufacture and sell a patent medicine, and this rule was not
altered by the fact that the defendants, before entering into part-
nership with the plaintiff, represented to them that they were the
proprietors of the patent medicine; for the plaintiff must be pre-
sumed to have known the law, and had no right to rely on such
representations. The defendants could not be restrained from
using the firm name of A. J. White & Co. (A. J. White being
one of them), because A. J. White was formerly in partnership
with the plaintiffs, and the firm name was then A. J. White & Co.
But defendants were restrained from using the name Dr. 0lforse's
Izdian Root Pills, used as a trade-mark by the plaintiffs, and
from using labels, &c., so like those used by the plaintiffs, as to
cause the public to believe that the medicine sold by the defend-
ants was manufactured by plaintiffs.
The executors and sons of the inventor (one Lieutenant Robert
James) of a valuable ointment known as Lieutenant James's
Horse Blister, carried on the manufacture after his death. Held
that an injunction would not lie restraining a grandson of the in-
ventor named Robert Joseph James, who had accidentally but not
fraudulently become possessed of the recipe, from manufacturing
and selling the ointment, describing it by the name of the inven-
tor,- provided people were not led to suppose that the preparation
was still manufactured by the inventor.
lfcAndrew v. Bassett, 4 DeQ., J. & S. 880. As to how long
user of a name for a trade-mark is necessary to acquire property
in it, Lord WESTBURY said: "But, it is urged that this word Ana-
tolia is a general expression ; is, in point of fact, the geographical
designation of a whole tract of country wherein liquorice-root is
largely grown, and is therefore a word common to all, and in it
there can be no property.
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"That argument is merely a repetition of the fallacy I have fre-
quently had occasion to expose. Property in the word for all pur-
poses cannot exist; but property in that word, as applied by way
of stamp upon a particular vendible article, as a stick of liquorice,
does exist the moment the article goes into the market so stamped,
and there obtains acceptance and reputation whereby the stamp
gets currency as an indication of superior quality, or of some other
circumstance which renders the article so stamped acceptable to
the public."
Burgess v. Burgess, 3 DeG., M. & G. 896. Lords Justices
KN rIGT BitucE and TURNER. Injunction refused restraining a
son from carrying on business in his own name, which had been
carried on by atd gained a great reputation under his father, in
the absence of proof of fraud.
Pidding v. Howe, 8 Sim. 477 ; Perry v. Truefitt, 6 Beav. 66;
Plavel v. hIarrison, 10 Hare 467; Leather Co. v. American
Leather Co., 4 DeG., J. & S. 137; s. c. 11 II..L. Ca. 523. The
case of Ford v. Foster, 27 L. T. R. N. S. 219 (1872), is rather a
singrular one. Ford had for many years sold an unpatented shirt
under the name of " Ford's Eureka ShIirt." In itdvertisements
and invoices lie falsely described it as patented, but not in the trade-
mark. Foster subsequently began using the mark of " Foster,
Porter J- (o's. Improved Eureka." Vice-Chancellor BACON
refused an injunction against defendant. On appeal the Lords
Justices (JAMES and MELLISL) granted a perpetual injunction, de-
ciding, 1st, that Eureka was not Publieijuris; 2d, that the imita-
tion by defendant of plaintiff's trade-mark was substantial and
injurious ; 3d, that the false representation by plaintiff that he was
patentee of the shirt, not being in the trade-mark itself but in an
entirely collateral representation, was no ground for refusing the
injunction; though semble, that, if defendants had been injured by
that misrepresentation, they might bring an action on the case
against plaintiff. In Sykes v. Sykes, 3 B. & C. 541, there was an
actual though innocent misrepresentation, the trade-mark itself
stating that the article was patented. The article had been patented
and the patent had run out. The court would not disturb verdict
obtained by plaintiff. In Ford v. Foster, supra, Lord Justice
ME'LLISH, in commenting on Srykes v. Sykes, says: "I am of opinion
that probably it would be held at law that if the trade-mark itself
contains a false representation no action could be maintained ; and so
